Raidz identity and social linking

Status: production runtime active; external user consent has not been exercised as part of operator verification.

Trust model

Raidz creates a private creator profile and a random, HTTP-only, SameSite=Lax session before any provider is linked. The session contains no wallet key, OAuth token or Telegram credential. Users explicitly connect and disconnect each provider.

Wallet

The web app uses Reown AppKit with the Ethers adapter instead of depending on a browser-injected wallet.
The supported network is Robinhood Chain ID 4663; AppKit requests a switch when necessary.
The API creates a five-minute, single-use challenge bound to app.raidz.fun, the checksummed wallet address, chain ID, issue time and expiry.
The message says explicitly that it is not a transaction or token approval.
The server recovers the signer and rejects wrong-chain, wrong-wallet, invalid, expired, consumed and replayed proofs.
Only the address, chain, verification time and signature hash are retained. The signature is not logged.

X

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code with PKCE and unpredictable state.
Read-only scopes: users.read, tweet.read and offline.access.
No post, Like, Repost, Follow or reply scope.
State and verifier expire after five minutes and are single-use.
The verifier and returned token material are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM.
The normalized public profile is retained; the provider subject is HMAC-hashed with a separate identity pepper.
Callback, token and profile failures return a bounded reason code without leaking provider material.
The production client, callback, PKCE challenge and read-only scope request have passed a provider authorization preflight. No operator completed a user-consent flow.
A separate bearer-token identity lookup returned HTTP 402 Payment Required; X API reads may require PAYG usage balance before a post-consent profile lookup can complete. No plan, bundle, subscription or spend was purchased.

Telegram Login data is verified server-side using Telegram's HMAC construction.
Payloads older than five minutes, more than one minute in the future, malformed hashes and invalid signatures are rejected.
The provider subject is HMAC-hashed. Only normalized name, handle and public avatar URL are retained.
Telegram account identity does not imply channel ownership; channel proof remains a separate future feature.
The app also offers an explicit external link to https://t.me/Raidz_fun. It never attempts to join a channel on a user's behalf.
The production bot is @RaidzFun_bot. Its token passed provider validation, its command set is installed, and the bot is an administrator of @Raidz_fun.

Operational wallet

A project hot wallet is separate from user wallet connection and never enters the browser bundle.
Wallet material may be loaded only from the protected /wallets/raidz vault or an external signer.
Secret files, private keys and seed phrases are never committed, logged or copied into deployment reports.
The protected runtime wallet is configured for Robinhood Chain 4663; its public address is 0x1352eF6957f8248DBCba4Ed96bb93B4E7a7406A9.
At verification it held 0 wei. No signing, funding, approval, transfer or transaction was attempted.

Profile privacy

Profiles begin private and unavailable for work.
Display name, bio, language, region, narrative and availability are user-controlled.
Jurisdiction is collected for eligibility and is not public by default.
Provider connections show a normalized handle/address and verification state, not credentials.
Disconnect removes the social link and encrypted provider token, or revokes wallet linkage.
Public-profile publishing remains an explicit toggle.

Threat cases and controls

Threat	Control
Session fixation or theft	Random UUID session, HTTP-only Secure cookie, expiry, revocation field, no session ID in URLs
CSRF	SameSite cookie, JSON mutation requests, same-origin API proxy, disabled cross-origin API access
Wallet replay	Single-use database challenge, five-minute expiry, atomic consumption
Wrong domain/chain/wallet	Server-generated message bound to domain, chain `4663` and checksummed address
OAuth interception	PKCE S256, unpredictable state, session binding, exact redirect URI
OAuth secret disclosure	Server-only environment injection, AES-256-GCM at rest, logger redaction
Telegram replay/forgery	HMAC verification, timing-safe comparison and five-minute freshness window
Account collision	Unique provider-subject and user-provider constraints
Excessive social access	Read-only X scopes and explicit normalized-field consent
Accidental public exposure	Private and unavailable defaults; explicit visibility controls

Production configuration

Secret values are delivered from a root-only host vault through read-only Compose mounts. The container entrypoint copies only an allowlist into a private in-container runtime directory, applies restrictive permissions, then drops to the unprivileged service account. Direct secret values are neither placed in Compose environment variables nor committed.

RAIDZ_AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY: base64url-encoded 32-byte key
RAIDZ_IDENTITY_PEPPER: high-entropy HMAC pepper
RAIDZ_X_CLIENT_ID and, when required, RAIDZ_X_CLIENT_SECRET
RAIDZ_TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN; RAIDZ_TELEGRAM_BOT_ID is optional because the numeric ID is derived from a valid token, and RAIDZ_TELEGRAM_BOT_USERNAME is optional public metadata
RAIDZ_REOWN_PROJECT_ID: Reown Cloud project ID, passed to the web build as NEXT_PUBLIC_REOWN_PROJECT_ID

The RAIDZ_* names above are host-side Compose inputs. Inside the API container, each secret may be supplied directly or through the corresponding AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE, IDENTITY_PEPPER_FILE, X_CLIENT_ID_FILE, X_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_FILE, or RAIDZ_HOT_WALLET_FILE; production uses the file form. The registered X callback is exactly https://app.raidz.fun/api/v1/auth/x/callback. Provider buttons remain visibly gated when configuration is absent. The Telegram bot is packaged under the integrations Compose profile and runs only with its protected token mount.